Description
Against the Epicureans and Academics (in Short Nonfiction Collection, Vol. 051 )
1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used
even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the
greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those
who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny
that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged
to affirm the contrary, the negation-that there is nothing universally
true. Slave! not even this-for what is this but to say that if there is
anything universal it is falsehood?
2. Again, if one should come and say, Know that nothing can be known,
but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it
shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man; or again,
another, Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn
anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou
wilt_-now wherein do such men differ from those-whom shall I
say?-those who call themselves Academics? Assent, O men, that no man
can assent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one.
3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men
with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For
what saith he? Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor
mistaken-there is no natural fellowship among reasoning beings, believe
me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms. What is
that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all
other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one
another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay-but much the
better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at
night for our